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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Nous étudions le développement d'un duopole dans un modèle en temps continu d'investissement 
en capacité sans engagement des firmes quant à leurs actions futures. Bien que les unités de 
capacité soient coûteuses, indivisibles, durables et de taille non négligeable par rapport au marché, 
l'entrée hâtive ne peut conférer d'avantage durable et à partir d'un certain niveau de 
développement du marché, les deux firmes sont en activité. Nous évaluons les options réelles 
d'investissement dans ce contexte. Initialement, le seul équilibre Markovien parfait (ÉMP) est un 
équilibre de préemption dans lequel le premier investissement en capacité se produit plus tôt et 
comporte un risque plus élevé que socialement désirable. Une collusion tacite pour retarder les 
augmentations de capacité subséquentes peut devenir possible en ÉMP. La volatilité du marché et 
sa vitesse de croissance jouent un rôle crucial : l'émergence d'équilibres de collusion tacite est 
favorisée par une volatilité plus grande, une croissance plus rapide et un taux d'intérêt ou 
d'actualisation plus faible. 
 




We study the development of a duopoly in a continuous-time model of capacity investment under 
no commitment by firms regarding future actions. While capacity units are costly, indivisible, 
durable, and large relative to market size, early entry cannot secure a first-mover advantage and 
both firms are active beyond some level of market development. We evaluate the investment real 
options in that context. In the early industry development phase, the sole Markov Perfect 
Equilibrium (MPE) is a preemption equilibrium with the first industry investment occurring 
earlier (hence being riskier) than socially optimal. Once both firms hold capacity, tacit collusion, 
taking the form of postponed capacity investment, may occur as a MPE. Volatility and the 
expected speed of market development play a crucial role in competitive behavior: we show that 
the emergence of tacit collusion equilibria is favored by higher demand volatility, faster market 
growth, as well as by lower discount rate. 
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“Real life” investment games played between competing ﬁrms in oligopolistic markets
typically share the following characteristics. The environment (demand, information
and knowledge, supply of inputs) is uncertain in many ways and evolves over time. The
investment units come in ﬁnite discrete sizes, that is, investments are indivisible and
lumpy. Undoing an investment strategy is costly, that is, investments are in part irre-
versible. Capacity is built or technology adoption is achieved in multiple discrete and
separable steps engaged at diﬀerent times without commitments as to future actions or
investment levels and timing. As capacity is built over many periods, ﬁrms keep pro-
ducing and competing, that is, their long term and short term decisions are intertwined.
Firms have some (endogenous) ﬂexibility to adapt the course of their investment strat-
egy to exogenous changes in their environment as those strategies are implemented. At
the industry level, investments come in waves, with all ﬁrms investing simultaneously,
or in sequences, with ﬁrms investing at diﬀerent times. Typically, investment (capacity
building) games eventually come to an end as the relevant market matures.
Although uncertainty is a common feature of the economic modeling of investment
games, other stylized facts are less frequently modelled. Typical models assume that
ﬁrms make a unique decision and must live with that decision afterwards. Such models
include models of technology adoption, models of entry, and numerous forms of two
stage models where ﬁrms ﬁrst make and commit to long term decisions (stage one)
before competing in short term decisions (stage two).
Using a strategic real option approach, we develop a model of investment decision
making incorporating some of the stylized features identiﬁed above: uncertainty, indivis-
ibility, irreversibility, ﬂexibility, dynamic choices of capacity building, no commitments
on future actions and strategies, endogenous end to the investment game, and both
investment waves and sequential investment timings over time.
The analysis of strategic considerations, in a game theoretic sense, is still in its in-
fancy and should be high in the real option research agenda.1 The real option approach
1Among investment evaluation methods, the real option approach is reaching advanced textbook
status and is rapidly gaining reputation and inﬂuence among practitioners. Although both academics
and practitioners warn against its sometimes daunting complexity, they also stress its unique ability
to take account of ﬂexibility in managing ongoing projects, which is a signiﬁcant but often neglected
1emphasizes the irreversibility, hence indivisibility, of investments.2 Indivisibility often
imply a limited number of players, hence imperfect competition. Yet, while it is often
stressed that the real option approach is best to analyze investments of strategic impor-
tance — the word ’strategic’ appears repeatedly in the real option literature — the bulk
of that literature involves decision makers confronted with a stochastic but non-reacting
nature rather than reacting competitors.3
The present paper extends the recent contributions in diﬀerent ways while bringing
to bear the older literature on strategic investment,4 in addressing issues such as the
role of investment decisions in shaping the structure of a developing sector, the emer-
gence of preemption with rent equalization and dissipation5 versus tacit collusion with
rent maintenance, the existence or not of a ﬁrst-mover advantage,6,a n dt h ee ﬀect of
strategic competition on real option exercise rules.7 We consider dynamic investments
without commitment in an homogeneous product duopoly where rival ﬁrms face market
development uncertainty and invest in lumpy increments of capacity. Typically, ﬁrms
hold investment options. We ﬁnd optimal exercise rules and determine the value of the
corresponding options as well as of the ﬁrms holding them.
source of value.
2Henry (1974) and Arrow and Fisher (1974) were precursors of the approach. In his treatment of
the cost beneﬁt analysis of a “new circumferential highway” around Paris, Claude Henry showed that
using the Simon-Theil-Malinvaud certainty equivalent approach “will here, systematically and unduly,
favor irreversible decisions, for example, destroying the forests and building the highway.”
3There are notable exceptions. Grenadier (1996) uses a game-theoretic approach to option exercise
in the real estate market; Smets (1995) provides a treatment of the duopoly in a multinational setup,
which serves as a basis for the oligopoly discussion in Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 309-14); Lam-
brecht and Perraudin (1996) and D´ ecamps and Mariotti (2004) investigate the impact of asymmetric
cost information on ﬁrms’ investment strategies; Baldrusson (1998) considers a duopoly model where
ﬁrms make continuous incremental investments in capacity showing that when ﬁrms diﬀer in size ini-
tially, substantial time may pass until they are of the same size; Grenadier (2002) provides a general
solution approach for deriving the equilibrium investment strategies of symmetric ﬁrms, in a Cournot-
Nash framework, facing a sequence of investment opportunities with incremental capacity investments,
showing that competition may destroy in part the value of the option to wait; Weeds (2002), Huisman
(2001), Huisman and Kort (2003) study option games in a technology adoption context; Boyer et al.
(2004) study a duopoly with multiple investments under Bertrand competition; Smit and Trigeorgis
(2004) discuss diﬀerent strategic competition models in the context of real options.
4Most notably Gilbert and Harris (1984), Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), and Mills (1988).
5As in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985).
6As in Gilbert and Harris (1984) or Mills (1988).
7The recent synthetic work of Athey and Schmutzler (2001) brings some generality and clarity to our
understanding of the role of investment in market dominance. They show in particular that, when ﬁrms
are farsighted and not committed to strategic investment plans, there is little hope to obtain deﬁnitive
predictions outside speciﬁcm o d e l s .
2Our main results are as follows.
Two types of equilibria may arise. In preemption equilibria, which always exist,
ﬁr m si n v e s ta td i ﬀerent market development thresholds, hence at diﬀerent times. In
“tacit collusion” equilibria, which only exist under some conditions, ﬁrms invest at
the same market development threshold, hence simultaneously, and thus such equilibria
correspond to “investment wave” equilibria. In preemption equilibria, rents are equalized
and partly dissipated while in tacit collusion equilibria, ﬁrms exercise market power by
implicitly agreeing to postpone their respective investments in capacity building. If
ﬁrms have equal positive capacities, then the preemption equilibrium exhibits diﬀerent
but uniquely determined market development investment thresholds, hence uniquely
speciﬁed but stochastic investment timings with either ﬁrm moving ﬁrst. If ﬁrms have
diﬀerent capacities and end game conditions are close to be met, the smaller ﬁrm acts as
ﬁrst mover. When they exist, tacit collusion or investment wave equilibria are typically
numerous and Pareto superior to preemption equilibria from the ﬁrms’ viewpoint. Tacit
collusion is more proﬁtable when ﬁrms have equal capacity in the sense that, when tacit
collusion equilibria exist, the joint investment (stochastic) date that maximizes combined
proﬁts is an equilibrium if and only if ﬁrms are of equal size. Moreover, ﬁrms may be
able to tacitly collude at some stages of market development but not at others.
Low initial capacities are of particular interest in the case of emerging sectors. When
at least one ﬁrm has no capacity, preemption is the sole equilibrium as tacit collusion
cannot then be enforced since the ﬁrm the ﬁrm cannot be threatened with the loss of an
existing rent. Hence, even though the (preemption) equilibrium is characterized by the
presence of only one active ﬁrm at ﬁrst, the initial development of the industry is highly
competitive as rents are equalized and partly dissipated. Paradoxically, once both ﬁrms
are active, the industry may become less competitive as tacit collusion equilibria become
possible.
It is well known that higher volatility raises the value of investment options because
a ﬂexible decision maker can achieve higher exposure to upside movements and lower
exposure to downside ones. In a strategic setup, higher market volatility also favors also
the emergence of tacit collusion equilibria. Similarly, higher expected market growth as
well as a lower cost of capital favor the emergence of tacit collusion equilibria. Hence, our
results suggest that investment waves (joint investment timings) may signal the exercise
3of market power and are more likely when ﬁrms have similar positive capacities, market
growth is high, volatility is high, and/or interest rates are low.
After presenting the model, the competition framework, and the investment game in
Section 2, we proceed in Section 3 with the analysis of essentially all possible industry
development histories, more speciﬁcally with the explicit analysis of three diﬀerent situ-
ations that essentially cover all relevant one s .W ec o n c l u d ei nS e c t i o n4 .D e t a i l e dp r o o f s
are provided in the Appendix.
2. The model
2.1 Industry characteristics
We consider the development of an industry where demand is aﬀected by multiplicative
random shocks. The inverse demand function at time t ≥ 0i sg i v e nb y :
P(t,Xt)=Yt D
−1(Xt), (1)
where Xt ≥ 0 is aggregate output, Yt ≥ 0 is a random shock, and D :I R + → IR + is the
non-stochastic component of demand.
Assumption 1
Demand D(·) is strictly decreasing, continuously diﬀerentiable and integrable on IR + and
D(0) = limp↓0 D(p) < ∞;t h em a p p i n gx 7→ xD−1(x) is strictly concave on (0,D(0));
aggregate shocks (Yt)t≥0 follow a geometric Brownian motion:
dYt = αYtdt + σYtdZt (2)
with Y0 > 0, α>0, σ>0,a n d(Zt)t≥0 a standard Brownian motion with respect to the
complete probability space (Ω,F,P).8
Firms are risk neutral and discount future revenues at the same rate r>α . Investment
takes place in a lumpy way. Each capacity unit costs I, which is constant over time,
8Thus market demand is driven by consumers’ tastes for the output, not by replication of the initial
consumers as in Gilbert and Harris (1984).
4produces at most Q =1unit of output, does not depreciate, and has no resale value.
2.2 Competition, output, and investment
We consider a duopoly. At any date t, ﬁrms ﬁrst take their investment decisions and
then compete in quantities (` al aC o u r n o t ) subject to capacity constraints.9 Speciﬁcally,
within the instant [t,t + τ), the timing of the game is as follows: (i) ﬁrst, each ﬁrm f
chooses how many capacity units ν
f
t to invest in, given the realization of the demand




t ); (ii) next, each ﬁrm selects an output






t ; (iii) last, market price is determined according





The speciﬁcation of inverse demand (1) implies that the short-run Cournot game
is independent of the realization of the current industry-wide shock. We can assume
that, in the absence of capacity constraints, this game has a unique equilibrium (xc,x c).
Let kc = dxce be the minimum capital stock required to produce xc.I ti st h e ne a s yt o
check that, with given capacities kf ≤ k−f, only three Cournot equilibrium outcomes
can occur: (i) both ﬁrms are constrained, so that xf = kf and x−f = k−f; (ii) the
smaller ﬁrm is constrained, so that xf = kf, while the bigger ﬁrm is not and reacts
o p t i m a l l yb yc h o o s i n gx−f on its reaction function; (iii) both ﬁrms are unconstrained,
so that xf = x−f = xc. The corresponding instantaneous proﬁto faﬁrm with capacity
k when its competitor holds   capacity units can be conveniently denoted Ytπk ,w h e r e
πk  depends on capacities only.
2.3 Markov strategies
A key assumption of our model is that ﬁr m sc a n n o t( c r e d i b l y )c o m m i tt of u t u r ei n v e s t -
ment and output decisions. The game typically generates several investments occurring
in endogenous order at endogenous dates. There is no commitment by the ﬁrms with
respect to their role as ﬁr s to rs e c o n di n v e s t o ro rt ot h en u m b e ro fu n i t st h e yw i l la c -
quire. The natural equilibrium concept here is the Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE),
in which ﬁrms’ investment and output decisions at each date depend only on the ﬁrms’
capital stocks measured in capacity units, (kf,k−f), as well as on the current level of
9See Boyer et al. (2004) for a related preemption model with instantaneous competition in prices
(Bertrand).
5the industry-wide shock y. This rules out implicit collusion between ﬁrms when decid-
ing on output: at each date, and given their current capacities, ﬁrms play the unique
equilibrium of the static Cournot game described above.
Our deﬁnition of Markov strategies and of the resulting payoﬀs is in line with the
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) concept of mixed strategies for timing games in continuous
time. The main diﬀerence is that, while they focus on deterministic environments,
demand ﬂuctuates randomly in our model.10 The basic idea is to construct an adequate
continuous time representation of limits of discrete time mixed strategy equilibria by
deﬁning a strategy for ﬁrm f as a function sf specifying the intensity s
f
νf(kf,k −f,y) ∈
[0,1] with which ﬁrm f invests in νf capacity units given the capital stocks (kf,k−f)a n d
the industry-wide shock Yt = y. Given a strategy proﬁle (sf,s −f), U
f
(sf,s−f)(kf,k −f,y)
denotes ﬁrm f’s expected discounted proﬁti ns t a t e( kf,k−f,y).11 In the rest of the
paper, we will omit ﬁrm and strategy proﬁle indices in the expression of value functions
when no ambiguity arises.
2.4 Firm valuation
Since (Yt)t≥0 is a time homogenous Markov process, an outcome may be described as
an ordered sequence of investment triggers together with the short-run instantaneous
proﬁts of both ﬁrms Ytπk  and Ytπ k between investments. Let yij (with yij = yji),
where i and j refers to the ﬁrms’ capacities immediately before Yt reaches yij for the
ﬁrst time,12 denote the value of Yt that triggers a new investment when total industry
capacity is i + j. If the game is over, then yij = ∞.
10Ap r e c i s ed e ﬁnition of Markov strategies and payoﬀs under uncertainty can be found in Boyer et
al. (2004, Appendix A).
11The important intuitions that our paper will convey can be grasped in terms of pure strategies.
However, in symmetric cases, there will be situations where two pure strategy equilibria exist, where
either ﬁrm invests ﬁrst and the other ﬁrm second, for identical payoﬀs. Then there is a possibility,
if ﬁrms use pure strategies, of both ﬁrms investing simultanously by mistake, a sort of coordination
failure. Indeed, a ﬁrm prefers to invest if its opponent does not but prefers not to invest if its opponent
does. Hence both ﬁrms wish to avoid the worst of all cases, namely simultaneous investments. Under
the foregoing deﬁnition of Markov strategies, strategies can be designed such that no entry mistakes





where kf = k−f =0 ,ν f = ν−f =1 , and yP is the level of Yt that triggers the ﬁrst ﬁrm investment in
the equilibrim. This acts as a correlation device: each ﬁrm is equally likely to invest in state (0,0,yP),
but the probability of simultaneous entry is zero. This formally jsutiﬁes the usual less rigorous approach
consisting in determining at random a (lucky) ﬁrst mover.
12Since capacity units do not depreciate, higher triggers along a given development path correspond
to higher industry capacity levels: yij ≤ yk  ⇔ i + j ≤ k +  .
6Suppose Yt = y and let us consider, for simplicity, investments of one single capacity
unit only (ν = 1), as investments in multiple capacity units can be treated as one-
unit investments occurring at the same time. Let L(i,j,y) denote the current value of
the ﬁrm of capacity i if it carries out an investment immediately, while its opponent
has capacity j.L e t F (i,j,y)b et h ec u r r e n tv a l u eo ft h eﬁrm of capacity i when its
competitor with capacity j carries out an investment immediately. Let S (i,j,y)d e n o t e
the current value of the ﬁrm of capacity i, with its competitor holding capacity j,i fb o t h
ﬁrms make a simultaneous investment at some future date when Yt reaches say yij.
The following lemma gives analytical expressions for the L, F,a n dS functions. The
expressions are divided into a ﬁrst part corresponding to the current investment and a
second part corresponding to the continuation of the game. The latter part is not fully
speciﬁed at this stage; it will be determined recursively by backward induction, starting
from the ‘horizon’, deﬁned in state space as the ﬁrst (stochastic) time a situation (or
capacity combination) is reached such that it is certain that no more investment will
take place.
Lemma 1 let Yt = y. The value of the ﬁrm of capacity i, when it invests immediately


















2)2 +2 r/σ2 > 1 and c(k,j,y) is the continuation value
of the same ﬁrm at the time of the next industry investment, if any.
Its value, when it stays put while its competitor of capacity j i n v e s t sn o w ,i sg i v e n















Its value, when both ﬁrms invest simultaneously at some future trigger value yij,i s
























Consider the expression for L(i,j,y). The ﬁrst part
πkj
r−αy − I gives the expected
net present value of the proﬁt ﬂows achieved by increasing capacity from i to k =








adjusts the ﬁrst one for the eﬀect of subsequent invest-






may be viewed as a discount factor deﬁned over the state space rather
than the time space13 and the function c(k,j,ykj) is the continuation value function when
Yt = ykj.14 The expressions for F (i,j,y)a n dS (i,j,y) can be similarly understood.
2.5 Endgame conditions
Although the investment game imposes no restrictions on capacities, we can characterize
endgame conditions: the investment game is over if and only if it is known with certainty
that no ﬁrm will ever invest in additional capacity. The following proposition gives two
conditions, one necessary, one suﬃcient, for the investment game to be over.
Proposition 1 The investment game is over only if (necessity) either condition A or






gives the expected discounted value when Yt = y of receiving one dollar the
ﬁrst time Yt reaches yij >y , the length of time necessary to go from y to yij being random. If there is
no subsequent investment, so that yij = ∞, the second term in L vanishes.































is the expected present value of a random annuity Ytπkj lasting
between today (when Yt = y)a n dt h er a n d o md a t ea tw h i c hYt will reach ykj. Suppose that the
investment occurring at ykj is made by the ﬁrm with capacity j and no further industry investment
occurs afterwards. Then at ykj, the new proﬁt ﬂow of the ﬁrm of capacity k becomes πk(j+1)Yt and
c(k,j,ykj) is the expected present value of that proﬁt ﬂow, namely
πk(j+1)
r−α ykj. The value function
L(i,j,y) is then completely deﬁned, provided the trigger value ykj has been determined: L(i,j,y)=
πkj






8over, the investment game is over if (suﬃciency) Condition A is satisﬁed:
(A) Neither capacity constraint is binding in the short-run Cournot game, that is,
kf ≥ kc =m i n {k ∈ IN |k ≥ xc}, f ∈ {1,2}.
(B) Both capacity constraints are binding in the short-run game and would remain
binding in case of a unit investment by any one ﬁrm.
Proposition 1 indicates (i) that no ﬁrm can keep its opponent out of the market in the
long run, and (ii) that a ﬁrm cannot use excess capacity in order to maintain a dominant
position in the long run.15 Condition (A)f a l l ss h o r to fi m p l y i n ge q u a lc a p a c i t i e sf o rb o t h
ﬁrms. However it implies that, if capacities are not equal at the end of the game, the
number of units used by each ﬁrm is the same. If capacities are not equal, some capacity
is idle.
Condition (A) is not necessary; however if it is not satisﬁed at the end of the game,
Condition (B) must hold. That condition pertains to tacit collusion. It describes a
situation where each ﬁrm could still proﬁtably increase its capacity if its rival did not
react. For such a situation to last forever (game over), it must be the case that ﬁrms
restrict capacity, hence output, in equilibrium. Such an equilibrium can hold only if
any deviation is adequately punished. Condition (B) describes a situation where a ﬁrm
can inﬂict a punishment on its competitor if the latter deviates. If the former ﬁrm were
no longer capacity constrained following an investment by its opponent (Condition (B)
not satisﬁed), then it would not be able to retaliate to the deviation. It is then certain
that the opponent would invest at some date t. The ability to retaliate is however not
suﬃcient to sustain a tacit collusion equilibriu m .W ec h a r a c t e r i z eb e l o wt h ec o n d i t i o n s
under which the retaliatory power is suﬃcient to oﬀset the gain from deviating. If the
ﬁrm to be punished is small, it does not lose as much from an increase in the capacity of
its opponent as if it were bigger. This implies that retaliation, hence collusion, is likely
15The conditions spelled out in Proposition 1 are not compatible with the situation found in Gilbert
and Harris (1984) where, in equilibrium, one duopolist concentrates the totality of industry capacity,
while the other ﬁrm holds no capacity. Their result can be traced to a technical assumption, claimed
to be “trivial in that both ﬁrms will earn zero proﬁts on new investments in a preemption equilibrium”
(p. 206), that gives a ﬁrst-mover advantage to one ﬁrm in order to rule out (mistaken) simultaneous
investments. The strategies and equilibrium concept deﬁned above avoid the necessity of any asymmetric
treatment.
9to be easier between ﬁrms of similar size and explains why the investment game cannot
be over unless both ﬁrms hold strictly positive capacities.
In what follows, ﬁrm asymmetry can only take the form of diﬀerences in current
capacities and may be thought of as inherited from past moves in the industry devel-
opment game. As discussed above, Lemma 1 provides only a partial characterization of
value functions under alternative investment strategies. Completing the characterization
requires knowledge of the continuation function c(·) and the appropriate trigger values.
These can be determined when the game between the two ﬁrms is suﬃciently near its
end, in the sense of Proposition 1. Once the continuation value function is known in such
situations, it is possible to characterize recursively the value function corresponding to
previous steps.
3. Industry development
Industry development proceeds by successive capacity acquisitions by one of the ﬁrms
or both. The particular demand function we use guarantees that the number of capacity
units that will eventually be installed is ﬁnite and that the industry development game
has an end. This is in contrast with most papers on related subjects (investment games;
R&D games, etc.) where it is assumed either that the players play only once or that the
game goes on indeﬁnitely.
Industry development possibilities may be represented as a tree whose nodes give
the number of capacity units held by each ﬁrm (Figure 1). While the ﬁgure indicates
possible sequences of capacity investments, it does not provide any indication about the
speed at which investments occur and nodes are reached.16
16In particular this representation is compatible with a ﬁrm acquiring more than one unit simul-
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Figure 1: Industry capacity development tree
We characterize the capacity acquisition path and the competition intensity prevail-
ing at various stages of market and industry development: ﬁrst, in the early stage when
ﬁrms hold no capacity (Case 1); second, at a later stage, when ﬁrms hold symmetric
(Case 2) or asymmetric (Case 3) capacities due to the unraveling of their respective
investment strategies. We ﬁrst consider situations that are “near” the end of the game:
from the nodes considered, a limited number of investments will lead to a situation
where the investment game is over in the sense of Proposition 1. Once these investment
developments are characterized, the previous relevant investment histories can be ob-
tained by backward induction: a limited number of investments will lead to a situation
or node from which the (not necessarily unique) unraveling of the investment game has
been characterized till endgame conditions are met. Once we have characterized those
situations that are “near” the end of the game, we generalize the analysis (in section
3.4) to arbitrary nodes in the industry development tree. Hence, we virtually consider
all relevant cases as the path to such characterizations is clearly beaconed.
113.1 Case 1: No existing capacity
We start with a situation where initial capacities are zero; let us assume that the mar-
ket is such that unconstrained ﬁrms would produce at most one unit each in Cournot
duopoly, that is:
Assumption 2 0 <x c ≤ 1.
Although this assumption allows the monopoly output to exceed unity, so that the
acquisition of more than one unit may be considered by any one ﬁrm, it also implies
that, if both hold one unit or more, the game is over by Proposition 1. Assumption 2
also implies that, whatever the (strictly) positive number of capacity units held by its
opponent, a ﬁrm obtains instantaneous proﬁt Ytπ11 once it invests in one unit or more;
consequently it will typically not acquire more than one unit.












where ν is the number of units acquired by the opponent before the ﬁrm acquires its
























, ∀ν ≥ 1. (4)
Knowing this, the value for the competitor of acquiring at least one unit immediately
at Yt = y, and any number of further units before Y reaches the threshold y∗
01 can be
computed explicitly. For example if it acquires one unit immediately and abstains from


















01 = c(1,0,y), since no more investment is forthcoming beyond y∗
01 by Propo-
sition 1. Similarly, if the investment in the ﬁr s tu n i ti st ot a k ep l a c ei nt h ef u t u r ea t

































Figure 2 illustrates the functions L(0,0,y), L∗ (0,0,y)a n dF∗(0,0,y).
17We leave to the reader the straightforward task to adapt the formula and the rest of the argument
for any number of units acquired by the ﬁrst investor before the other one invests at y∗
01. For example if
the ﬁrm plans to acquire a second new unit at some y0, y ≤ y0 <y ∗


















01,y ≤ y0 <y ∗
01 where π21 = π11 by Assumption
2. If this value is higher than (5), then it gives the correct expression for L(0,0,y); if it is lower, then
(5) is the appropriate expression. Note that the number of candidates to try is low as it cannot exceed










Figure 2: Firm values under alternative strategies
It is straightforward to check from (3)—(6) that, within the interval (0,y∗
01), there
exists a unique value y
p
00 such that for y<[>,=]y
p
00, L(0,0,y) < [>,=]F(0,0,y), with
the corresponding stochastic stopping time being τ
p
00 =i n f{t ≥ 0|Yt ≥ y
p
00}.
We now determine the ﬁrms’ equilibrium strategies before any ﬁrm has invested,
that is, in states of the form (0,0,y). If y<y
p
00,i n v e s t i n gi sf o rb o t hﬁrms a strictly
dominated strategy while for y ≥ y∗
01, delaying investment any further is also a strictly
dominated strategy. To determine the equilibrium outcome when y
p
00 ≤ y<y ∗
01,i ti s
helpful to consider what would happen if one of the ﬁrms were protected from preemption
and could thus choose its optimal stand-alone investment date as a monopoly.18 Given
a current industry-wide shock y, the maximal expected payoﬀ that this ﬁrm could then
achieve by taking the lead is L∗ (0,0,y). This is strictly higher than F∗ (0,0,y).19 In an
MPE, however, such a value gap cannot be sustained. If a ﬁrm anticipates that its rival
will ﬁrst invest at yL
00, then the former is better-oﬀ preempting the latter at yL
00 − dy.
This is true for any y between y
p
00 and yL
00. When the industry-wide shock Yt is equal
to y
p
00,t h ev a l u eo fb o t hﬁrms is the same, so each ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between investing
immediately and letting its rival invest while waiting to invest until Yt reaches y∗
01,a tt h e
18Katz and Shapiro (1987).
19Everything happens as if the ﬁrm is myopic and takes no account of the future entry of the follower.
This is is line with Leahy (1993): when computing its optimal stand-alone date, a myopic ﬁrm overstates
by the same amount the value of the investment option and the marginal beneﬁt from investing, leaving
the investment rule unaﬀected.
14stochastic time τ∗
01 =i n f {t ≥ 0|Yt ≥ y∗
01}. The following proposition is a transposition
of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985, Proposition 2A) in a stochastic context.
Proposition 2 (Preemption equilibrium) Under Assumptions 1 and 2, if Y0 ≤ y
p
00,
1. There exists only one MPE outcome of the investment game: one ﬁrm invests at
τ
p
00, while the other ﬁrm waits until τ∗
01 to invest; both times are stochastic.
2. Rents are equalized to the value of the second investor given by (3).
The preemption MPE is characterized by intense competition. The ﬁrst capacity unit
is installed earlier than under protection from preemption since y
p
00 <y L
00,r e ﬂecting a
partial dissipation of monopoly rents (Posner, 1975, Fudenberg and Tirole, 1987).
3.1.1 Socially optimal investment timings
It is more diﬃcult to compare the MPE outcome with the social optimum. Speciﬁcally,
let k0 = dD(0)e be the minimum capital stock required to produce D(0). The social


















where by convention τk0+1 = ∞. Standard computations imply that it is optimal for the











Clearly, yO <y L
00.S i n c ey
p
00 <y L




However, modifying slightly the model allows an unambiguous comparison between
the MPE outcome and the social optimum, thus identifying the key factors involved in
a general comparison. Indeed, suppose that the inverse demand curve is a step function,
D−1(Q)=D−1(dQe); because of the assumption of unit capacity increments, the steps
correspond to capacity levels, so that each capacity unit produces at full scale once
15installed.20 Then π10 = D−1(1) =
R 1
0 D−1(q)dq,s ot h a tyL
00 = yO. It follows that
y
p
00 <y O,s ot h a tt h eﬁrst capacity unit is introduced too early in an MPE,r e l a t i v et o
the social optimum. This happens because rents accruing to each ﬁrm must be equalized
in an MPE, while, from a social point of view, each successive capacity unit yields less
value than the preceding one as the consumers’ marginal willingness to pay decreases. In
order for the ﬁrst capacity unit to yield no more rent than the second unit in equilibrium,
the ﬁrst investor must therefore waste resources to compensate for interim earnings so
that its value does not exceed that of the second investor.
The result that the ﬁrst industry investment occurs earlier under duopoly than in
the social optimum does not depend on the market size assumption kc =1 . A sπ11 =
D−1(2) =
R 2
1 D−1(q)dq, the second investor introduces the second capacity unit at the
socially optimal date. Since it acts like a monopoly with respect to the market residual
demand and since it does not hold any capacity, it will invest as soon as the market is
able to support a second capacity unit. However, if the ﬁrm that makes the last industry
investment already held some capacity, it would postpone its investment in order not to
cannibalize its demand. We will show that this is indeed the case.
3.2 Case 2: Symmetric capacities
Let us now investigate the role of existing capacity, starting in this section with situations
where ﬁrms have identical capacities, as illustrated by the subgame starting at node (k,k)
in Figure 1. As in the previous subsection, we will assume that the ﬁrms hold a capacity
lower than the unconstrained short-run Cournot output, which implies that both ﬁrms
are initially capacity constrained and that a ﬁrm remains constrained if its opponent
invests:
Assumption 3 0 <x c − k ≤ 1
Assumption 3 is compatible with an unconstrained monopoly output exceeding k+1,
so that it does not rule out investments exceeding one unit, allowing a ﬁrm to get ahead
by more than one unit. It does imply that the end of the game is not too far in the
20The assumption D−1(Q)=D−1(dQe) reduces the consumer surplus by the triangles between the
initial inverse demand curve and the steps of the new inverse demand curve, located entirely below the
former. In an industry involving indivisible capacity units the same assumption of a stepwise demand
would be necessary to ensure that perfect competition coincides with the social optimum.
16sense that, by Proposition 1, the game is over once both ﬁrms have acquired at least
o n em o r eu n i t .T os i m p l i f ye x p o s i t i o n ,w et a k ek =1 . Then Assumption 3 implies that
π21 >π 11, π22 >π 12,a n dπν2 = π22 = π2ν, ∀ν ≥ 2.
When considering a new investment, ﬁrms will now take into account the conse-
quences on the proﬁts they derive from their existing capacity. We will show that, as
a result of the cannibalism eﬀect, tacit collusion equilibria may exist besides the pre-
emption equilibrium, provided that either late joint investment or no more investment
dominates preemption over the whole relevant market development range.
3.2.1 The preemption MPE
The investment game with symmetric capacities always has a MPE. Assume that one
of the ﬁrms has taken the lead by acquiring at least one new unit, bringing its total
capacity to ν ≥ 2. For its rival, whatever the number of units held by the ﬁrst investor,
it is a dominant strategy by Assumption 3 to acquire one and only one unit at the
market development threshold determined by the following optimal stopping problem:
for y<y 1ν,
F

























The situation is similar to the case with no initial capacity except that the trigger value,
at which the second investor invests, depends on the number ν of units held by the initial
investor. The higher ν, the earlier the second investor will invest because its proﬁts π1ν
while waiting are lower the higher ν.
The ﬁrm that invests ﬁrst, whether it acquires one single unit or more units, under-
stands all implications of its investment(s) on the behavior of its competitor, so that
L(1,1,y) can be computed explicitly. For example if the early investor acquires only
17one unit, its payoﬀ at the current level of y ≤ y∗

















As before, if the ﬁrm were able to choose the investment threshold in the absence of any











But under a preemption threat, the ﬁrm cannot wait until Yt reaches yL
1ν and invests
at trigger level y
p
1ν, at which rents are equalized. The following result then parallels
Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 (Preemption with equal capacities) Under Assumptions 1 and 3, the
investment game has a preemption MPE such that any one ﬁrm invests when Yt reaches
y
p
1ν while the other ﬁrm invests when Yt reaches y∗
1ν.
In this equilibrium, the threat of preemption leads to rent equalization and thus to the
complete dissipation of any ﬁrst-mover advantage. However, with positive capacities,
the preemption equilibrium may not be the sole type of MPE, as we shall now see.
3.2.2 Tacit collusion MPE
T h ef a c tt h a tt h eﬁrms hold strictly positive capacities gives rise to the possibility of
ad i ﬀerent type of MPE. The strategies involved consist in coordinating on a random
j o i n ti n v e s t m e n td a t eo ri na b s t a i n i n gf r o mi nvesting forever. We call these strategies
tacit collusion strategies as they imply an increase of ﬁrms’ values above the preemption
equilibrium level. Note that short-run output decisions are still determined according
to Cournot competition. Collusion is achieved only through ﬁrms’ investment strategies
and not through production decisions. This implies that the only way ﬁrms can sustain a
21Again the reader can adapt the candidate expressions for L(1,1,y), with y∗
1ν given by (9), for any
new capacity purchase exceeding one unit (ν>2). The highest such candidate gives L(1,1,y). It is
certain to exist because, as shown in the proofs, the candidate for L corresponding to ν = 1 exceeds
F∗ (1,1,y)f o rs o m er a n g eo fy values lower than y∗
12.
18tacit collusion outcome is by investing simultaneously, rather than at diﬀerent times, and
b yd o i n gs oa tat h r e s h o l dys
12 exceeding y∗
12. Indeed if one of the ﬁrms were to invest in a
second capacity unit at some y<y ∗
12, the latter’s unique optimal continuation strategy
would be to invest at y∗
12.T h i sc a nb eaMPE only if y = y
p
12 as shown in the analysis of
the preemption MPE characterized above. Since simultaneous investments of one unit
imply by Assumption 3 that both ﬁrms then hold more capacity than the unconstrained
Cournot output, they will not acquire more than one unit. Furthermore the game is
then over by Proposition 1.
Suppose that the ﬁrms could commit to invest simultaneously at some random future
date or to abstain from investing forever. Given a current industry-wide shock y,t h e

















If π22 >π 11, S (1,1,y) has a maximum with respect to ys




















11 =i n f {t ≥ 0|Yt ≥ ys∗
11} as the corresponding investment (stochastic) timing. If
π22 ≤ π11, S (1,1,y) attains a maximum of π11
r−αy by letting ys∗
11 = ∞ (tacit collusion by
inaction), in which case τs∗
11 = ∞. Clearly if L(1,1,y)e x c e e d sS∗ (1,1,y)a ta n yy ≤ ys∗
11,
tacit collusion is not an equilibrium since each ﬁrm then has an incentive to deviate and
invest earlier. Hence,




1. A necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of a tacit collusion MPE
is L(1,1,y) ≤ S∗ (1,1,y) ∀y<y ∗
12. If this inequality is strict for all such y,
there exists a continuum of tacit collusion MPE, indexed by their joint investment
triggers ys
11 in a range [ys,y s∗
11], where y∗
12 ≤ ys ≤ ys∗
11.
2. Rents are equalized in each tacit collusion MPE and exceed the preemption MPE
rents; the Pareto optimal tacit collusion MPE corresponds to the joint proﬁts max-
19imizing investment rule under the constraint that ﬁrms invest simultaneously if
they do.22 In this joint-proﬁt maximization tacit collusion MPE,e a c hﬁrm invests







⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0i f y ∈ [0,ys∗
11),
1i f y ∈ [ys∗
11,∞).
3. If π22 >π 11, the Pareto optimal tacit collusion MPE has both ﬁrms investing when
Yt reaches ys∗
11; otherwise it is such that neither ﬁrm ever invests.
Propositions 2 and 4 highlight the role of existing capacity in the exercise of market
power. A ﬁrm that holds no capacity has no incentive to restrain output and thus tacit
collusion cannot exist if one ﬁrm has zero capacity (Proposition 2).23 Moreover, the mere
existence of an incentive to tacitly collude is not enough to guarantee that tacit collusion
is sustainable: ﬁrms must also follow investment strategies such that a deviation from
the tacit collusion outcome would trigger a reaction leading to a new equilibrium with
a lower value for the deviating ﬁrm. This “punishment” is made diﬃcult because our
assumption of a Cournot production equilibrium in any period implies that restraining
output can only be achieved by postponing capacity investments in the industry. It
follows in particular that the joint investment trigger in any tacit collusion equilibrium
must be higher than both triggers in the MPE characterized in Proposition 3. Moreover,
a ﬁrm becomes more vulnerable to a deviation by its competitor once the trigger value
for the ﬁrst investment in the preemption equilibrium has been crossed: once y>y
p
11 and
until y reaches the threshold for the second investment, a deviation yields the defector a
higher rent L(·)t h a nt h er e n tF∗ (·) obtained by its competitor who would then invest
optimally at y∗
12. Therefore, the rents S∗ (·) under tacit collusion MPE must be attractive
enough (Proposition 4(b)) to beat such defection at any level of y preceding y∗
12.
22Absent that constraint, joint proﬁts maximization would involve sequential investments. As men-
tioned above, such an investment sequence cannot be sustained as an MPE outcome of our duopoly
model, as it would generate a strictly higher expected payoﬀ for the ﬁrst investor and would therefore
be subject to preemption.
23In the language of contestability, this says that the level of contestability is stronger when the
contesting ﬁrm is not yet active.
20Proposition 4 provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition for tacit collusion MPEst o
exist. This condition implies restrictions on the components of L(1,1,y)a n dS∗ (1,1,y):
ﬁrst, the four proﬁtv a l u e sπij determined by the non-stochastic component of demand
D(·) under Cournot competition; second, the parameters underlying real option values,
that is, the value of β as determined by the discount rate r as well as the drift α and
the volatility σ of the stochastic demand shock process.
Let e Λ(β,I)={(π11,π 12,π 22,π 21) | E (y;I,β)=S∗ (1,1,y) − L(1,1,y) ≥ 0 ∀y<y ∗
12}
(e Λ(β,I)i st h es e to fπij quadruples for which tacit collusion equilibria exist given β and
I); the following proposition states that this set is non empty, is independent of I (that
is, e Λ(β,I)=Λ(β)), and is larger in industries with higher volatility, faster growth and
lower cost of capital (that is, Λ(β0) ⊂ Λ(β)i ﬀ β<β 0).
Proposition 5 (Tacit collusion: existence) Under Assumptions 1 and 3:
1. There exists a set of market parameters guaranteeing the existence of tacit collusion
MPE.
2. This set is independent of the investment cost I of a capacity unit.
3. It is larger, the higher demand volatility, the faster market growth, and/or the
smaller the discount rate.
As we know from the real option literature, increased volatility raises the option value of
an irreversible investment under no preemption threat: the ﬁrm increases its investment
threshold to reduce the probability that the stochastic process reverts to undesirable
levels after the ﬁrm has invested. The ﬂexibility to do so increases the value of the
ﬁrm; the more so, the higher the volatility. Such an eﬀect is also present here. But
there is another eﬀect of volatility: an increase in volatility raises ﬁrm values more
in a tacit collusion equilibrium than in the preemptive equilibrium, thus favoring the
emergence of the former. The reason comes from both timing and discounting. Tacit col-
lusion equilibria involve higher investment thresholds (longer delays), while an increase
in volatility amounts to a lower discount rate (recall that β decreases with volatility
σ) because it raises the probability that a given threshold value of y b er e a c h e di na n y
given amount of time. Although instantaneous proﬁts are always independent of β,t h e
discounted value of the proﬁt ﬂows corresponding to each equilibrium does depend on














12, the former increases more than the latter when β decreases,
that is, when volatility increases. To put it diﬀerently, the beneﬁts of restraining sup-
ply through delaying investments occur in a distant future, that is, in a higher state of
market development, while the beneﬁts from deviating occur in the immediate future.
Other things equal, more volatility gives relatively more weight to the former than to the
latter, contrary to conventional wisdom whereby increased volatility, because it warrants
a risk premium, amounts to an increase in the discount rate.
The intuition for the role of the (time) discount rate and the market growth rate is
similar: a lower discount rate favors future payoﬀs and a larger expected growth rate
raises future prospects relative to immediate ones. Hence, both favor the emergence of
tacit collusion equilibria through a lower β.
3.3 Case 3: Diﬀerent capacities
While we have shown that existing capacity is a necessary condition for tacit collusion
between identical ﬁrms, capacity is also often said to play a role as a barrier to entry and
thus can be used as a way to acquire and maintain a dominant position or a ﬁrst-mover
advantage. We assume now that ﬁrms diﬀer in their initial sizes. Referring to Figure 1,
we now investigate investment subgames such as the game starting at node (k0,k 0 +1 )
and contrast them with sub-games such as the game starting at node (k,k)a n a l y z e di n
the previous section. We showed that, with symmetric capacities, there are two possible
types of MPE : the preemption equilibrium and the tacit collusion equilibrium. The
former always exists, is highly competitive and involves rent equalization. The latter
exists under some conditions, provides higher rents to both ﬁrms, and also involves rent
equalization. We will show that some of these characteristics are modiﬁed under asym-
metric capacities: initial capacity asymmetry prevents rent equalization in equilibrium
and makes collusion more diﬃcult in the sense that joint proﬁts maximization is not
compatible with a MPE.
Without loss of generality, suppose that one ﬁrm holds k0,k 0 ≥ 1, capacity units
while the other holds k0 +1u n i t s ,t h a tk0 = 1 to facilitate exposition, and that
Assumption 4 0 <x c − k0 ≤ 2.
22The unconstrained Cournot output is then xc ≤ 3, either 1 <x c ≤ 2o r2<x c ≤ 3,
with π31 >π 21, π2ν >π 1ν, ∀ν.
Consider ﬁrst the case where 1 <x c ≤ 2. The larger ﬁrm holding two units may
be capacity constrained when the smaller ﬁrm holds only one unit but it will become
unconstrained if the smaller ﬁrm invests in a second capacity unit. Thus, by Proposition
1, the investment game cannot be over at node (1,2). If the smaller ﬁrm invests, both
ﬁr m st h e nh o l de n o u g hc a p a c i t yt op r o d u c exc and the game is over by Proposition 1.
Moreover, the smaller ﬁrm beneﬁts more from acquiring one new unit than the bigger
ﬁrm does and this beneﬁt from investing is positive at high enough levels of Yt. Therefore,
the smaller ﬁr mi st h es o l ei n v e s t o ri ne q u i l i b r i u ma n dt h eg a m ee n d sw h e nb o t hﬁrms
hold 2 units of capacity.
Consider now the case where 2 <x c ≤ 3. Both ﬁrms hold a lower capacity than
the unconstrained short-run Cournot output so that both are initially constrained and
each ﬁrm remains constrained if its opponent invests. By Proposition 1 this may be the
end of the game, although not necessarily so; this possibility will be considered further
below. Two alternative candidate preemption equilibria may be considered: one,where
the bigger ﬁrm invests ﬁrst and the smaller ﬁrm acts accordingly; another, where the
roles are reversed. The corresponding values of the bigger and the smaller ﬁrm, acting
as ﬁrst or second investor are respectively L(2,1,y)a n dF∗ (2,1,y)f o rt h eb i g g e rﬁrm,
and L(1,2,y)a n dF∗ (1,2,y)f o rt h es m a l l e rﬁrm.24 When the smaller ﬁrm invests ﬁrst,
node (2,2) is reached and both ﬁrms remain capacity constrained, which is the situation
we analyzed in subsection 4.2: both ﬁrms then hold 2 units of capacity and assumption
3h o l d sw i t hk =2 , so that Propositions 3, 4, and 5 apply. The continuation of the
game is then known and L(2,1,y)a n dF∗ (1,2,y) can be computed.25 If the bigger ﬁrm
invests ﬁrst, then it is a dominant strategy for the smaller ﬁrm to do invest at some ﬁnite
future level of Yt,s i n c eπ13 <π 23 <π 33 as the larger ﬁrm must accommodate (Cournot
equilibrium). It is then straightforward to obtain F∗ (2,1,y)a n dL(1,2,y).
We will show that, unlike the case with symmetric initial capacities, the next invest-
24Explicit expressions are given in the proof of Lemma 2. As in previous cases, it is tedious but
conceptually easy to check whether the ﬁrst mover acquires only one, or more, new capacity units
before its rival invests. We treat the case where the ﬁrst mover acquires only one extra unit here.
25If tacit collusion MPE exist besides the preemption equilibrium, we assume that the ﬁrms reach the
tacit collusion MPE that maximizes joint ﬁrm value under the constraint of simultaneous investment.
23ment is undertaken by the smaller ﬁrm in any preemption equilibrium. In order to prove
that result, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 2 If L(2,1,y) >F ∗(2,1,y) for some y<y ∗








12) and L(2,1,y) <F ∗(2,1,y) for y<y
p
12.
The lemma indicates that, by investing at y = y
p
12,t h es m a l l e rﬁrm leaves the bigger
ﬁrm indiﬀerent between investing immediately or waiting. Furthermore we show in the
proof of the next proposition that, at y = y
p
12,t h es m a l l e rﬁrm strictly prefers investing.
A l s o ,a ta n yo t h e rr e l e v a n tl e v e lo fy, the gain for the bigger ﬁrm from investing ﬁrst is
smaller than the gain for the smaller ﬁrm to do so. These results imply that the sole
preemption equilibrium is one where the smaller ﬁrm catches up. Trivially, if the bigger
ﬁrm ﬁnds unproﬁtable to invest, then the smaller ﬁrm can invest at its stand-alone date
y∗
12 without worrying about preemption.
Proposition 6 (Preemption with diﬀerent capacities) Under Assumptions 1 and 4,
1. There exists a unique preemption equilibrium, where the smaller ﬁrm invests when




2. In this preemption equilibrium, the smaller ﬁrm enjoys a strictly positive rent
from investing ﬁrst as L(1,2,y
p
12) − F∗ (1,2,y
p
12) > 0,w h i l et h eb i g g e rﬁrm is






3. Once node (2,2) is reached, Proposition 3 applies, mutatis mutandis.
In the preemption equilibrium the laggard not only catches up but also enjoys an ad-
vantage in terms of value. The reason is not because the laggard is in a better position
to avoid immediate cannibalism: although the drop in revenues from existing capacity
is indeed smaller for the smaller ﬁrm when industry output increases, the drop in price
is the same, whichever ﬁrm invests. Thus the source of the ﬁrst-mover advantage must
be found in future decisions rather than current eﬀects. If the bigger ﬁrm were investing
ﬁrst, the other ﬁrm could plan its own investment at its stand-alone date. Having less
to loose from the cannibalism eﬀect, it would invest earlier in the future than a bigger
24ﬁrm would. This reduces the advantage enjoyed by its bigger opponent from taking the
lead.
The preemption equilibrium of Propositi o n6a l w a y se x i s t sa n di ti su n i q u ei nt h e
class of equilibria involving investment by both ﬁrms at diﬀerent dates or investment
by one ﬁrm only. As with equal capacities, there may exist another class of equilibria,
tacit collusion equilibria, involving simultaneous investment or inaction by both ﬁrms.
The next proposition shows that, as with equal capacities, higher volatility and faster
growth make tacit collusion MPE more likely.
Proposition 7 (Tacit collusion with diﬀerent capacities) Under Assumptions 1 and 4,
1. If π32 − π22 =0 : no tacit collusion equilibrium exists.
2. If π32 − π22 > 0: the set of market parameters ensuring the existence of tacit
collusion MPE becomes larger, the larger demand volatility is, the faster market
growth is, and/or the smaller the discount rate is.
3. Joint-proﬁts maximization is not compatible with equilibrium.
As discussed in the case of equal initial capacities, tacit collusion involves postponing
capacity investments in order to restrain output. Beneﬁts from tacit collusion arise in
a more distant future than beneﬁts from taking the lead. Consequently the existence
of a tacit collusion equilibrium rests on conditions under which the future weights rela-
tively more, either because of signiﬁcant market growth, or because of high volatility, or
because of a low discount rate, as previously. However tacit collusion is less attractive
when ﬁrms hold diﬀerent capacities since joint proﬁt maximization is not compatible
with equilibrium: being diﬀerent, ﬁrms prefer diﬀerent thresholds for simultaneous in-
vestment and the smaller ﬁrm would deviate (invest earlier) from a strategy of joint
investment at the joint proﬁt maximizing threshold.
3.4 Generalization
We have considered explicitly three cases in this section: no initial capacity (0,0), equal
initial capacities (k,k)a n dd i ﬀerent initial capacities (k0,k 0+1), each with an assumption
on the maximum market size limiting the number of possible remaining investments (in
25the sense of Proposition 1): 0 <x c ≤ 1f o rt h e( 0 ,0) case; 0 <x c ≤ 2f o rt h e( k,k)c a s e
(taking k =1 ) ;a n d0<x c ≤ 3f o rt h e( k0,k 0 + 1) case (taking k0 = 1). The three cases
cannot be viewed as particular subgames of a wider game because these assumptions
diﬀer from one another. Let us now relax assumptions 2 and 3 keeping only Assumption
4w i t hk0 = 1. The entire game can be solved using the above results.
This is illustrated in Figure 3 giving all possible capacity combinations if the market
is such that xc ≤ 3a n dkm ≤ 4. Since the game is symmetric we represent only com-
binations where Firm 1 is at least as big as Firm 2. Any node may be considered as
initial node for a subgame. However we are interested in industry development, that is
the game that starts at (0,0) with y low and we will focus on equilibrium paths for that
game. This eliminates all capacities in excess of the monopoly capacity.26 Nodes that
are necessarily endgame nodes, according to Proposition 1(A), and at which no ﬁrm
holds more than the monopoly capacity, are represented with square brackets in the ﬁg-
ure. Other possible endgame nodes, in the sense of Proposition 1(B), are denoted with
curly brackets; they correspond to tacit collusion situations, in the sense of propositions
4, 5, and 7. Equilibrium steps are indicated by single arrows in case of single moves
(preemption or stand alone) or double arrows in case of simultaneous moves (collusion).
A question mark next to an equilibrium step indicates the corresponding step is not
necessarily an equilibrium.





Yt, xc = kc = 3 and the maximum monopoly







(1,0) {(2,1)} ⇒?( 3 ,2) [(4,3)]
% &%&% &
(0,0) {(1,1)} ⇒? {(2,2)} ⇒?[ ( 3 ,3)]
{(.,.)}: potential endgame; ⇒?: potential tacit collusion MPE branch;
[(.,.)]: endgame (if reached); %: stand alone or preemption MPE branch.
Figure 3: Complete industry development game when xc =3
The subgame starting at node (2,2) satisﬁes Assumption 3 for k =2 . I ta d m i t sa
preemption MPE d e s c r i b e di nP r o p o s i t i o n3l e a d i n gt oa ne n da t[ 3 ,3]. As described
in Propositions 4 and 5 and denoted by the double arrow with a question mark, the
subgame starting at (2,2) may also have tacit-collusion MPE’ s .I nt h a tc a s et h ee n di s
either at (2,2) or at (3,3) and the corresponding ﬁrm values are equalized, but higher
than in the preemption MPE.
Trivially subgames starting at (3,0), (3,1), or (3,2) end up at [3,3] as the bigger
ﬁrm is then either passive in which instance the smaller ﬁrm invests at its stand-alone
thresholds, or is preempted by the smaller ﬁrm in MPE.27 Similarly subgames starting
at (4,0) or (4,1) end up at [4,3].
27For example, consider the possible alternatives from (3,0): either the bigger ﬁrm invests ﬁrst,
leading to (4,0) and a continuation with the small ﬁrm investing at its stand-alone thresholds until
[4,3] is reached; or the small ﬁrm invest ﬁrst, leading to (3,1), (3,2), and (3,3), or to (3,1), (4,1), (4,2)
and (4,3). Two conditions are necessary for the ﬁrst alternative to be a MPE: ﬁrst the monopoly tenure
of the big ﬁrm on its fourth unit must be suﬃciently long to earn back the investment cost I on the
unit. Second the small ﬁrm must not invest before the bigger one. Adapting the proof of Proposition 6
where it is shown that the smaller ﬁrm invests ﬁrst in preemption MPE, it can be shown that the ﬁrst
condition is violated if the second one is satisﬁed.
27The Subgame starting at node (2,1 )i ss t u d i e di np r o p o s i t i o n s6a n d7 .T h ep r e e m p -
tion path leads to (2,2) for a possible end of game at (2,2) or continuation to (3,3),
whether directly in collusion MPE,o rv i a( 3 ,2) in preemption MPE.T h e r em a ya l s o
exist a collusion path to (3,2) and (3,3).
The subgame starting at (1,1) has not been studied for xc ≤ 3b u to n l yf o rxc ≤ 2.
However, now that its two possible continuations, via (2,1) or via (2,2), are known,
Propositions 3, 4, and 5 may be adapted accordingly. Precisely suppose that the contin-
uation of the game follows the preemption path (1,1) − (2,1). When applying Lemma
1t oe v a l u a t eL(1,1,y), one must substitute for the continuation value c(2,1,y). If the
next equilibrium segment is the preemption segment (2,1)−(2,2), this is F∗ (2,1,y)a s
given in the proof of Lemma 2; similarly the expression for F∗ (1,ν,y),ν=1 , given by
(8) for xc ≤ 2 must be replaced by the expression applying when xc ≤ 3, as provided
in the proof of Lemma 2. Alternatively, if the next equilibrium segment is the tacit
collusion segment (1,2)−(2,3), then c(2,1,y)i se q u a lt oS (2,1,y) given in the proof of
Proposition 7. The qualitative results are unchanged. That is the subgame starting at
(1,1) always admits a preemption MPE via (2,1) and (2,2); a collusion equilibrium via
(2,2) may exist depending on considerations discussed in Proposition 5. In both cases
the continuation is known and the game ends at (2,2) or (3,3). If a collusion MPE
exists for the subgame starting at (2,1), Proposition 7 indicates that it does not exhibit
rent equalization. Then by the standard preemption argument used repeatedly in this
paper, a preemption MPE exists at node (1,1) where the ﬁrst investor invests at such a
threshold that ﬁr m sv a l u e sa r ee q u a l i z e d :L(1,1,y)=F∗ (1,1,y).
Comparing the subgames starting at (1,1) and at (2,2) we note that a preemption
equilibrium always exists and collusion equilibria may exist. However the game starting
at (1,1) may also involve collusion from (2,1) to (3,2) unlike the game starting at (2,2)
where collusion at (3,2) is not possible. This raises the issue of multiple equilibria. We
have shown however that ﬁrm values are higher under collusion than under preemption
in the game starting at (2,2). Although we do not provide a formal proof, this is also
likely to be the case in the subgame starting at node (1,1); Equilibria can probably be
Pareto ranked. In any case, if tacit collusion from node (2,1) is a possible MPE,i tl e a d s
to (3,2). By Proposition 1, this cannot be the end of the game; it is a dominant strategy
for the smaller ﬁrm to acquire one further unit and for the bigger one to abstain so node
28(3,3) is reached. By Proposition 1, thisi st h ee n do ft h eg a m e ,w i t hb o t hﬁrms holding
equal capacities.
Turning to the subgames starting at (2,1) and (1,1), it can be shown that the small
ﬁrm invests ﬁrst from (1,0) or from (2,0).28 Finally, considering the initial node (0,0)
it is now trivial to adapt Proposition 2 replacing the continuation values corresponding
to the initial Assumption 2 with the equilibrium values for the game starting at (1,1)
under the new assumption xc ≤ 3. A unique preemption MPE leading to (1,1) via (1,0)
exists for each possible continuation at (1,1); several MPE continuation may exist from
that node on, all leading to equal size ﬁrms at the end of the game, as indicated in
Figure 3 and further discussed in the conclusion below.
Thus the complete game starting at (0,0) with y small and under assumption xc ≤ 3
can be solved entirely following the procedure just described. Further generalization to
higher maximum industry size would not aﬀect the qualitative properties of the model,
which we summarize in the next section.
4. Conclusion
We characterized the development of a stochastically growing industry where duopolists
make irreversible lumpy investments in capacity units without commitments regarding
their future actions and make optimal use of their ﬂexibility to adapt to the stochastic
evolution of the market. The capacity unit never becomes small relative to the market
despite unbounded market development, so that there is an end to the investment game.
We found that the early phase of development is characterized by intense competition:
while only one ﬁrm is active, competition is ﬁerce as the unique equilibrium is the
preemption equilibrium. This competition intensity causes the ﬁrst industry investment
to occur earlier than would be socially optimal.29 This deadweight loss is inevitable
as the rents of both ﬁrms must be made equal, no matter what market volatility and
growth are. The empirical implication of this result is that the ﬁrst entrant ends up
28The proof is similar to that sketched in Footnote 27.
29In a setup anologous to natural monopoly, that is, if the cost of acquiring the next unit is decreasing
i nt h en u m b e ro fu n i t sa l r e a d yh e l db yaﬁrm, this eﬀect would be galvanized as the entrant would have
to enter suﬃciently early and waste enough resources to dissipate a monopoly rent that would be enjoyed
forever. Only then would its competitor be indiﬀerent between entering or abstaining from producing
forever.
29facing riskier returns and a higher probability of bankruptcy than socially optimal. This
happens even if it is known that the market will develop over the long run. Intense
competition destroys value in the early phase of market development as the preemption
motive overwhelms the option value.
The smaller ﬁrm eventually catches up to the larger one as a ﬁrm cannot durably
keep its opponent at bay by holding as many capacity units as the market can bear.30
Moreover, tacit collusion equilibria may exist when both ﬁrms hold positive capacity;
they take the form of postponed simultaneous investment by both ﬁrms. Such equilibria
are more likely to emerge in highly volatile and/or faster growing industries. This eﬀect
of volatility is new to the literature. The conventional real option result that high
volatility delays investment is reinforced by the fact that higher volatility may allow
a switch from the preemption equilibrium to a tacit collusion equilibrium involving
further delayed investment and higher ﬁrm values. Tacit collusion requires simultaneous
investment by both ﬁrms. When ﬁrms are of equal size, this is compatible with joint
proﬁt maximization; but when ﬁrms diﬀer in size, the simultaneous investment threshold
that maximizes joint proﬁts is beyond the level that maximizes the expected value of the
smaller ﬁrm. Hence tacit collusion is more attractive for ﬁrms of equal size.31 Traditional
measures of competition may be deceiving: competition is more intense when one single
ﬁrm is active, as preemption is then the sole equilibrium, while tacit collusion is more
likely when ﬁrms are both active, of equal size, and the market develops quickly, with
much volatility, under low interest rates or cost of capital.
30Possible sources of ﬁrst-mover advantage or rationale for a dominant position have been considered
repeatedly in the literature. In Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1988), the fact that contesting a dominant
ﬁrm is costly secures the latter’s dominant position. Although investment is costly in our model, this
argument does not apply because the market develops, so that competition is not only over current sales
but also over the next capacity investment. No ﬁrm enjoys any cost advantage over that investment. In
dynamic situations - patent races or investment games - the issue has often been whether an exogenous
advantage in terms of timing could generate rents. In Gilbert and Harris (1984) this does not prevent
rent dissipation. In Mills (1988), the exogenous ability to move ﬁrst can be used to make a costly
preliminary investment which works as a threat that keeps the rival at bay and thus generates rents
for the ﬁrst mover. Similarly, in patent race games, Fudenberg et al. (1983) and Harris and Vickers
(1985) have established that when a ﬁrm exogenously gets an arbitrarily small head start, there is a
unique perfect Nash equilibrium in which the ﬁrm with the head start surely wins. In the present paper,
diﬀerences between ﬁrms can only result from past capacity investments. It is rather remarkable that
being big is not like enjoying a head start in a race; quite the contrary, being big makes the threat of
early subsequent investment less credible, which implies that, in a preemption equilibrium with ﬁrms
of diﬀerent sizes, it is the smaller ﬁrm that moves and invests ﬁrst.
31This further suggests that explicit coordination, such as alliances, acquisitions and mergers, may
be more valuable (more attractive), the more unequal the ﬁrm sizes are.
30Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Let Yt = y.T h ev a l u eo faﬁrm at date t is the expected present
value of its proﬁts over the periods between investments by either ﬁrms, minus the
present value cost of the investments made by the ﬁrm. In the case of a ﬁrm of capacity































where τkj is the random time, possibly inﬁnite, at which some further investment occurs.
The proﬁt ﬂow πkjYs replaces πijYs at t. If it is altered by some new investment by either




accounts for the new state.
T h et i m eh o m o g e n e i t yo f( Yt)t≥0 and the strong Markov property for diﬀusions imply




















We are interested in stopping regions of the form [ykj,∞). For any ykj > 0, let τ (ykj)=






















any y ∈ [0,y kj). Substituting into (A.1) yields the formula for L(i,j,y) given in the
Proposition. The other expressions are obtained in a similar way.
Proof of Proposition 1.
A strictly positive capacity is necessary. Suppose one ﬁrm has zero capacity. Then its
proﬁt is zero. If it buys one unit, the lowest instantaneous proﬁt it can make at any time
a f t e rm a k i n gt h a ti n v e s t m e n ti sYtπ1k,w h e r ek is the capacity at which its opponent
is unconstrained in the short run in response to an output of one: this corresponds
to the worst-case scenario where its opponent holds the capacity which leaves the ﬁrm
the lowest instantaneous proﬁta n dt h eﬁrm does not acquire any further units even
if it is proﬁtable for it to do so. The maximized expected discounted present value
from buying one capacity unit at some future time τ is, in that worst-case scenario,
31V (0,k,y)=s u p τ Ey ©R ∞
τ e−rtYtπ1kdt − e−rτI
ª
. Using the approach of Lemma 1 to







.T h ev a l u eo fy0k that solves





β−1 so that V (0,k,y) > 0. Thus the strategy of
never buying in the future is strictly dominated for the ﬁrm whose capacity is zero. In
consequence both ﬁrms will eventually hold strictly positive capacity.
Either A or B is necessary. Assume that neither A nor B holds, that is: let l and k be
the respective capacities; let l be such that the corresponding ﬁrm is capacity constrained
and let k be such that the ﬁrm that holds k units is not constrained if the other ﬁrm has a
capacity of l+1 or more units. If the ﬁrst ﬁrm increases its capacity to l+1 = n its current
instantaneous proﬁt increases to Ytπnk >Y tπlk and stays at that level forever since
the opponent, not being capacity constrained, has no alternative but to accommodate
by reducing output. The maximized gain in expected discounted present value from





r−α ylk − I
¢
.
This is positive, implying that a strategy of never investing in a situation where one ﬁrm
is constrained, while the other is unconstrained or would become unconstrained after a
unit investment by its opponent, is strictly dominated.
Condition A is suﬃcient. If neither capacity constraint is binding, no ﬁrm can
increase proﬁt by further investing so that the game is necessarily over.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . # 1 and #2. As shown in the main text, if a ﬁrm invests
the ﬁrst time Yt reaches y from below while the other ﬁrm waits, its payoﬀ is L(0,0,y)
as given by (5) and the payoﬀ of its opponent is F∗(0,0,y)g i v e nb y( 3 ). If both ﬁrms
invest simultaneously at Yt = y, taking ys
00 = y in Lemma 1, their payoﬀ is, e S (0,0,y)=
π11
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0, if y ∈ [0,y∗
01),ν≥ 1










32If the ﬁrst investor can increase its rent by investing in a second unit, that is if ∆L(1,0,y)=
π20−π10











then the MPE strategy proﬁle




1,y 10 ≤ y<y10
0, otherwise
where y10 ≤ y10 <y ∗
01. It is tedious, but not
diﬃcult, to also work out the corresponding value of y
p
00, which is lower since the rent of the ﬁrst
investor would otherwise exceed that of its opponent. We leave it to interested readers to adapt the
foregoing proof to such cases where it might be proﬁtable for the ﬁrst investor to invest more than once
before its opponent does.
32where s
f
1 (i,j,y) is a probability distribution satisfying the detailed deﬁnition given in
Boyer et al. (2004, Appendix A). It can be interpreted as the intensity with which ﬁrm
f invests in one unit of capacity in state (i,j,y), i.e. when it holds i capacity units,
its opponent holds j units, and Yt = y. We have shown already that, on [0,y
p
00), it is
a dominant strategy not to invest, and on (y∗
01,∞), it is dominant for a ﬁrm with zero
capacity to invest if the other holds one unit. The above strategy combination implies
that an investment is sure to occur the instant Yt reaches y∗
01 because then s
f
1 (0,0,y)a n d
s
−f


















until Yt reaches y∗
01.
We now show that the above strategy proﬁle is an MPE strategy proﬁle in any
subgame starting at y ∈ [y
p
00,y∗
01). For y ∈ [y
p
00,y∗
01), if ﬁrm f deviates by choosing
s0 (0,0,y) = 0, the other ﬁrm invests at y so that ﬁrm f’s dominant strategy in the
continuation is to invest at y∗
01 for a continuation payoﬀ of F∗ (0,0,y). If it chooses to




















1 (0,0,y), this is equal to F∗ (0,0,y). Thus, for any subgame starting
at y ∈ (y
p
00,y ∗
01), both ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between all possible choices. At y = y
p
00 the









positive as required by regularity condition (R2)i nB o y e ret al.. For the proof that there
is no other equilibrium outcome, we refer the reader to Fudenberg and Tirole (1985,
Appendix 1).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .For each y ∈ (0,y∗
12], F∗ (1,1,y),L(1,1,y), and e S (1,1,y)=
π22
r−αy−I are respectively the expected payoﬀso fb e c o m i n gt h eﬁrst investor, the second
investor, and of investing immediately, simultaneously with the other ﬁrm. As in the
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33P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . #1 Let L(1,1,y) ≤ S∗ (1,1,y) ∀y ∈ (0,y∗
12]. By the
deﬁnition of S∗ (1,1,y), one has L(1,1,y) ≤ S∗ (1,1,y) ∀y ∈ (0,ys∗
11]. We will show that
the following (tacit collusion) strategies, whose equilibrium payoﬀ is S∗ (1,1,y)f o rb o t h



























For either ﬁrm, say f,ad e v i a t i o nf r o ms
f
1 (1,1,y)e i t h e rr e s u l t si na ni n v e s t m e n ta f t e rys∗
11
is reached, or in an investment before ys∗
11 is reached. In the former instance, since −f has
already invested when f invests, the payoﬀ is F (1,2,y) <F ∗ (1,2,y) ≤ S∗ (1,1,y)w h e r e
the last inequality follows from the fact that ys
11 = y∗
12 is admissible in the maximization
that deﬁnes S∗ (1,1,y). If the deviation results in an investment by f before ys∗
11 is
reached, then −f applies s
−f
1 (1,2,y). The payoﬀ to f is L(1,1,y)i ft h ed e v i a t i o n
occurs before y∗
12 is reached and S (1,1,y)i fi to c c u r sa to ra f t e ry∗
12 (since in that case
−f invests immediately). Since S (1,1,y) ≤ S∗ (1,1,y), the above strategies yield a
MPE with joint investment at ys∗
11.
N o ww es h o wn e c e s s i t y ,i.e. that no equilibrium exists if L(1,1,y) ≤ S∗ (1,1,y)i s
violated. First, consider joint investment at ys
11 with payoﬀ ˜ S (1,1,y) ≤ S∗ (1,1,y).
Clearly the above strategy adjusted for joint investment at ys
11 rather than ys∗
11 yields a
MPE if L(1,1,y) ≤ ˜ S (1,1,y) ∀y ∈ (0,ys
11]; but L(1,1,y) ≤ ˜ S (1,1,y) ∀y ∈ (0,ys
11]
implies L(1,1,y) ≤ S∗ (1,1,y) ∀y ∈ (0,y∗
12], a contradiction. Second consider any
situation with L(1,1,y) >S ∗ (1,1,y)f o rs o m ey ∈ (0,y∗
12]; this implies L(1,1,y) >
˜ S (1,1,y) for any joint investment threshold other than ys∗
11;t h e nd e v i a t i o na ty is
preferable for any candidate joint investment threshold. This completes the proof of
existence.
With respect to the existence of a continuum of tacit collusion MPEs, suppose now
that S (1,1,y) >L (2,1,y)f o re a c hy<y ∗




















for all y ∈ [0,y∗
12]. Then, for any ys
11 ∈ [ys,ys∗
11], one can as above construct an MPE
such that ﬁrms invest jointly at τs
11 =i n f {t ≥ 0 | Yt ≥ ys
11}.B y d e ﬁnition of ys∗
11,t h e
expected payoﬀ from jointly investing at τs
11 is an increasing function of the investment
trigger ys
11 over the range [ys,ys∗
11]. It follows that these MPEs are Pareto ranked, and
that the Pareto optimal MPE corresponds to joint investment at τs∗
11.
34#2. Rents are equal and exceed F (1,2,y) by the deﬁnition of S.S i n c e t h e ﬁrms
act simultaneously, joint proﬁts equal 2S∗ (1,1,y) under joint investment at τs∗
11. Joint
investment is a contraint in the deﬁnition of S.
#3. As explained in the text, when π22 <π 11, ys∗
11 →∞ ;t h u sﬁrms never invest.
Otherwise the above strategy proﬁle implies joint investment at ys∗
11.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .We ﬁrst prove #3. Assume that π22−π11 > 0. By Proposition
4.1, a tacit collusion equilibrium exists if and only if E (y;I,β) is positive for all y<y ∗
12.33




y + I + K (β)y
β
for y ∈ [0,y∗






















The function E is strictly convex, strictly decreasing in a right neighborhood of zero,
and limy→∞ E (y;I,β)=∞. It follows that E attains its minimum at a unique point











E (y;I,β)=( 1− β)K(β)y
β







Changes in σ aﬀect the function E only through β; β is a function that is strictly
decreasing in σ and α (increasing in r) and that goes to 1 as σ →∞and as α ↑ r (as
r ↓ α), with σ ≥ 0a n dr>α .By the envelope theorem, E∗0(β) < 0. It follows that
if β<β
0 and E∗(β0)=0 , then E∗(β) > 0, so that E (y;I,β) > 0 ∀y. Consequently
Λ(β0) ⊂ Λ(β). This proves #3.
We now establish conditions under which Λ(β) is non empty and prove its inde-




















This is independent of I.Now we take β = 2 because this allows to deﬁne the admissible
set of πij suﬃciently explicitely to prove that the set is not empty. The condition
E∗ (2) ≥ 0 can be written, after some manipulations, as:
Q(x)=−x
2 + bx + c ≥ 0 . (A.4)
where b = π22 − π11, c =( π21 − π22)(π22 − π12), and x = π21 − π11. This quadratic
expression is subject to features implied by the output competition model, ﬁrst, under
Assumption 1 on demand; and second, under Assumption 3 for the equal capacity Case
2 under scrutiny. These features are: π21 >π 22 >π 11 >π 12 > 0a n dπ21−π11 >π 22−π12
where the last inequality means that the rise in proﬁt from increasing capacity from 1
to 2 units is higher when the opponent holds 1 unit than when it holds 2 units. Taking
π21 − π22 = 1 as normalization, the conditions of the Cournot model are equivalent to:
x>1; x>c; c>b; b>0. (A.5)
For values of x, b, and c satisfying conditions (A.5), Q(x) ≥ 0i fa n do n l yx is smaller







.T h i si s
possible if and only if the positive root is greater than both c and 1, or:
b ≥ max{1 − c, c − 1}
Existence of the tacit collusion MPE when β = 2 is therefore ensured when, in addition
to the regular features arising from the Cournot model and under the normalization
π21 − π22 =1 ,
π22 − π11 ≥ max{1 − (π22 − π12), (π22 − π12) − 1}
For example, if π21 =1 ;π22 = 5
6; π12 = 3
6; π11 = 3.5
6 , then π21 − π22 = 1
6; normalizing
requires multiplying all those values by 6; then π22 − π11 = 9
6 >π 22 − π12 − 1=1 .
Proof of Lemma 2. The values of the bigger ﬁrm and the smaller ﬁrm when their
opponent invests immediately are respectively F∗ (2,1,y)a n dF∗ (1,2,y). For the bigger
36ﬁrm,
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where S∗ (2,2,y)a n dL(2,2,y)c o r r e s p o n dt o
the tacit collusion and the preemption equilibria analyzed in Section 3.2 (for k0 =2 ) ,
respectively given by (11) taken at the joint-proﬁt maximizing trigger (12), and by (10).
Thus, in case of tacit collusion, it is assumed that the ﬁrms reach the highest payoﬀ
equilibrium; the proof can be adapted for any other tacit-collusion equilibrium. If a
tacit-collusion equilibrium does not exist at node (2,2), the maximum is trivially taken
to be given by the second term.
The smaller ﬁrm remains capacity constrained until it holds three units; if it allows
the bigger ﬁrm to invest ﬁrst, the latter will then have to accomodate whenever the
smaller ﬁrm introduces a new unit. Consequently, the smaller ﬁrm’s dominant policy in
that case is to acquire two units successively at its stand-alone trigger values:
F






























π33−π23 (r − α)I
β
β−1 be the corresponding
investment triggers.
Given the dominant policy of the smaller ﬁrm when the bigger ﬁrm invests ﬁrst, the











































For y ≤ y∗
13,l e tG(2,1,y) ≡ L(2,1,y) − F∗ (2,1,y) denote the gain for the bigger


















































Considering (11), (12), and (10),G (2,1,y) is concave whatever the maximum in the
last term and it is increasing in a right-neighbourhood of zero; also, G(2,1,0) = −I.
Consequently, if G(2,1,0) reaches a strictly positive value for some y<y ∗
13,t h e nt h e r e
exists at least one value of y in the interval [0,y ∗
13]s u c ht h a tG(2,1,y)=0 .W ed e ﬁne
y
p
12 as the smallest root.
Proof of Proposition 6.T h ec a s e0<x c − k0 ≤ 1( k0 =1 )i sd i s c u s s e di nt h em a i n
text; we focus on 1 <x c − k0 ≤ 2( k0 =1 )i nt h i sp r o o f .
Strategies and outcomes. By Assumption 4, if the bigger ﬁrm invests at y ≤ y∗
13,t h es o l e
possible continuation is one where the smaller ﬁrm invests at y∗
13 and then again at y∗
23.





0, if y ∈ [0,y∗
13)






0, if y ∈ [0,y ∗
23)
1, if y ∈ [y∗
23,∞)
.
Alternatively, if the smaller ﬁrm invests at some y ≤ y∗
13, the outcome is equal capacity,
w h i c hi st h es i t u a t i o na n a l y z e di nS e c t i o n3 . 2 . P r o p o s i t i o n s3a n d4g i v et h ea l t e r n a -
tive equilibria for the continuation. The preemption MPE always exist; tacit-collusion
MPEse x i s ti fa n do n l yi fL(2,2,y) ≤ S∗ (2,2,y) ∀y ∈ (0,y ∗
23] .I ft h e r ei sm o r et h a no n e
continuation MPE, we assume that the equilibrium ensuring the highest continuation
payoﬀ is selected.
Payoﬀs. The gain for the bigger ﬁrm to invest immediately, if the alternative is the
smaller ﬁrm taking the lead, is G(2,1,y)( s e ea b o v e ) . A sf a ra st h es m a l l e rﬁrm is
concerned, two alternatives may arise. Trivially, if investing when its opponent holds
one unit is a dominated strategy for the bigger ﬁrm (G(2,1,y) ≤ 0 ∀y ≤ y∗
13), then
Result #1 holds, with the smaller ﬁrm investing at its stand-alone date, i.e. when y
reaches y∗
12 for the ﬁrst time. Alternatively, if G(2,1,y) > 0f o rs o m ev a l u e so fy ≤ y∗
13
and if the strategy of the bigger ﬁrm is to take the lead if the smaller ﬁrm does not
do so ﬁrst, then the gain for the smaller ﬁrm to invest immediately is G(1,2,y) ≡
38L(1,2,y) − F∗ (1,2,y),y≤ y∗
13:














































Gain from investing immediately rather than waiting. Result #1 has just been es-
tablished when the gain G(2,1,y)f o rt h eb i g g e rﬁrm to invest immediately is non
positive ∀y ≤ y∗
13. We now assume G(2,1,y) > 0f o rs o m ey ≤ y∗
13 and compare it, as
given by (A.6), with G(1,2,y), the gain for the smaller ﬁrm to invest immediately, as
given by (A.7). Thus, for y ≤ y∗
13,
































































































Simplifying and using the fact that S∗ ≥ L,















































By deﬁnition of the preemption equilibrium at capacities (2,2) the rents of both ﬁrms
are equalized if one of the ﬁrms invests at Yt = y
p





























; substituting into the above
39inequality and rearranging,
G(1,2,y) − G(2,1,y) ≥

















































Evaluating the πij as price times quantity, and deﬁning pl as the industry price when
there are l = i + j capacity unit in the industry (without any ambiguity as long as
i,j ≤ 3s ot h a tﬁrms operate at full capacity), this can be written as:



















































22 a n dw en o t et h a tt h er i g h t - h a n d - s i d ei n




23. In order to
show that G(1,2,y) − G(2,1,y) > 0 ∀y ≤ y∗















23.T h e n












p5 −p4 < 0, G(1,2,y)−G(2,1,y)i si n c r e a s i n gi ny
p





23. In order to show that y∗
13 <y
p







β−1. Evaluating L(2,2,y)a n dF∗ (2,3,y)a tt h a tv a l u eo fy, it can be
shown that L(2,2,y∗
13) <F ∗ (2,3,y ∗









22, which concludes the proof that G(1,2,y) − G(2,1,y) > 0 ∀y<y ∗
13.
Thus the gain from investing immediately while its opponent waits is higher for the small
ﬁrm than it is for the bigger ﬁrm at any y<y ∗
13. For any y such that G(2,1,y) ≥ 0,
G(1,2,y) > 0 so the best response for the small ﬁrm to a strategy by the bigger ﬁrm
of investing at such level of Yt is to preempt at y − ε. Consequently a preemption
equilibrium with the bigger ﬁrm as ﬁr s ti n v e s t o rd o e sn o te x i s t .
Consider preemption by the smaller ﬁrm. If G(2,1,y) > 0f o rs o m ey<y ∗
13 so that
the bigger ﬁrm may invest ﬁrst if the smaller one does not preempt, then, by Lemma 2,
G(2,1,y
p
12)=0 .S i n c eG(1,2,y)−G(2,1,y) > 0, it follows that G(1,2,y
p
12) > 0. Then
the smaller ﬁrm should invest at y
p
12 which is achieved in equilibrium for the following





0, if y ∈ [0,y
p
12)





⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩








1, if y ∈ [y∗
12,∞)
.
The rest of the proof of #1 and #2 is a mere adaptation of the proof of Proposition
2. For the proof of uniqueness, we refer the reader to Fudenberg and Tirole (1985,
Appendix 1).
#3 can be readily veriﬁed.
Proof of Proposition 7.U n d e rA s s u m p t i o n4w i t hk0 =1 :
#1. If π32 − π22 = 0, there exists no value of Yt at which it is proﬁtable for the bigger
ﬁrm to invest if the smaller does so; thus there exists no tacit-collusion MPE with
simultaneous investment. Since π22 >π 12, abstaining from investing is a dominated
strategy for the smaller ﬁrm; thus there exists no tacit-collusion MPE by inaction.
#2. π32 − π22 > 0. The sole alternative to the tacit-collusion MPE, if it exists, is the
preemption MPE. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 4 so we only introduce
the main elements. By Proposition 6, for the bigger ﬁrm, the alternative to tacit col-
lusion is to be passive in the preemption MPE; for the smaller ﬁrm, the alternative
to tacit collusion is to be ﬁrst investor in the preemption MPE. Consequently, adapt-
ing Proposition 4, collusion is an MPE if and only if S (2,1,y) − F∗ (2,1,y) ≥ 0a n d
S (1,2,y) − L(1,2,y) ≥ 0f o ra l ly ≤ ys
21 where ys
21 is the threshold at which both ﬁrms
invest simultaneously. We compute these gains from tacit collusion.
First we evaluate S (2,1,y)a n dS (1,2,y). Since π32 − π22 > 0, 2 <x c ≤ 3, so that a
capacity of three units is necessary to produce the unconstrained Cournot output. In
case of simultaneous investment both ﬁrms acquire one unit at some common trigger
ys
21 to be deﬁned. Then the bigger ﬁrm holds three units and must accomodate any
increase in production up to xc by the smaller ﬁrm. Thus it is a dominant strategy




at y23 = ys
21 if ys
21 >y ∗
23. Once both ﬁrms hold three units each, the game is over by
Proposition 1(A). Thus the tacit-collusion equilibrium, if it exists, involves simultaneous
investment at ys
21, followed, possibly immediately, by an investment by the smaller ﬁrm.















































41where either y23 = y∗
23 >y s
21 or ys
21 = y23 ≥ y∗
23.34 N o ww ee v a l u a t et h eg a i nf r o m
colluding for the bigger ﬁrm, over its alternative of letting the smaller ﬁrm invest ﬁrst,
using the expression established in the proof of Lemma 2 for F∗ (2,1,y):















































Similarly, for the smaller ﬁrm, the gain from colluding over the alternative of investing
ﬁrst is, using the expression in the proof of Lemma 2 for L(1,2,y):


















































21 bethevaluesofy that maximize S (1,2,y)a n dS (2,1,y) respectively with
respect to ys
21.T h a ti s ,ys∗
12 = 1




π32−π21 (r − α)I
β
β−1.N o t et h a t
ys∗
12 <y s∗
21.C o n s i d e rys∗
12 and ys∗
21 as possible triggers in a tacit-collusion equilibrium; since
S (1,2,y)i sd e c r e a s i n gi ny beyond its maximum, it is a dominant strategy for the smaller
ﬁrm to invest when y ≥ ys∗
12.T h u si nMPE, ys
12 ≤ ys∗
12 and simultaneous investment at
ys∗
12 yields a higher payoﬀ to both ﬁrms than at ys
12 <y s∗
12. This equilibrium exists if and
only if both S (1,2,y) − L(1,2,y)a n dS (2,1,y) − F∗ (2,1,y) are non negative for any
y ≤ ys∗
12 = y23. The rest of the proof of #2, about parameter conditions, is otherwise
s i m i l a rt ot h a to fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .




34We take the case y23 = ys
21 corresponding to situations where y∗
23 <y s
21: the second investment of
the smaller ﬁrm occurs later under tacit-collusion than the stand-alone trigger y∗
23 would imply because
the smaller ﬁrm delays its ﬁrst investment beyond y∗
23 in order to collude. The approach is identical for
the alternative case and leads to the same implications.
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